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The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that estimates tax re-
action functions of governments competing with other governments. We analyze
consumption tax competition between US states, employing a panel of state-level
data for 1977{2003. More specically, we study the impact of a state's spatial
characteristics|that is, its size, geographic position, and border length|on the
strategic interaction with its neighbors. For this purpose, we calculate for each state
an average eective consumption tax rate, which covers both sales and excise taxes.
In addition, we pay attention to dynamics by including lagged dependent variables
in the tax reaction function. We nd overwhelming evidence for strategic interaction
among state governments, but only partial support for the eect of spatial character-
istics on tax setting. Tax competition seems to have lessened in the 1990s compared
to the early 1980s.
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US states have the legal power to set their own sales and excise taxes on goods and services.
Consequently, tax rates and bases dier by state. In 2002, for example, Mississippi levied
the highest sales tax rate (7 percent) of all US states. In contrast, Delaware, Montana, New
Hampshire, and Oregon did not impose a sales tax at all. Similarly, excise tax rates and
bases dier substantially. In 2002, New York levied a cigarette excise of US$ 1.50 per pack,
whereas Kentucky imposed a rate of only US$ 0.03 per pack. All states levied an excise
tax on cigarettes but 19 states did not charge excises on wine. Because commodity tax
bases (i.e., the individuals purchasing products and services) are mobile, states will seek
to steal tax base from one another by undercutting their neighbors' tax rates. This may
unleash a tax competition game in which states repeatedly interact with each other. Our
paper tries to empirically assess whether such strategic interaction exists between states.
We analyze consumption tax competition among US states, employing a panel data set
of state-level consumption taxes (i.e., retail sales taxes on goods and services and excise
taxes) for 1977{2003 covering 48 states.1 To this end, we estimate tax reaction functions of
state governments.2 The slope of the tax reaction function indicates to what degree state
government compete with each other.
Consumption tax competition has predominantly been studied from a theoretical point
of view.3 Recently, researchers' attention has shifted from theoretical to empirical work.
Prior contributions are small in number and focus primarily on the United States.4 All
1We do not cover sales and excise taxes at the local (county and municipal) level. Federal excises on
transportation, communication, energy, alcohol, and tobacco are excluded as well.
2See Breuckner (2003) for an overview.
3Key contributions are those of Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Kanbur and Keen (1993), Lockwood (1993),
Trandel (1994), Hauer (1996), Ohsawa (1999), Wang (1999), Nielsen (2001), Nielsen (2002), Ohsawa
(2003, 2004), and Ohsawa and Koshizuka (2003). Wilson (1999) provides a more general overview of the
tax competition literature.
4Studies on the United States are: Nelson (2002), Rork (2003), Luna (2004), Egger et al. (2005b), and
Devereux et al. (2007). Evers et al. (2004) focus on diesel excise competition in Europe. Egger et al.
(2005a) deals with tax competition among OECD countries.
1studies employ the concept of a linear tax reaction function, which models the tax rate of
the home jurisdiction as a function of that of other jurisdictions and various characteristics
of the home jurisdiction. Estimated slopes of the tax reaction function vary substantially.
Some studies nd counterintuitive negative slopes for sales taxes (Rork, 2003), whereas
others nd values close to 0.9 for excises (Egger et al. 2005b). The latter suggests a
substantial degree of interaction in tax setting, almost one for one. On average, across all
studies, the reaction coecient is 0.5.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, our study employs an aver-
age eective tax rate (AETR) as measure of the tax burden.5 The AETR on consumption
(or implicit consumption tax) is dened as the ratio of the sum of sales tax and excise tax
revenues to total consumption expenditures. Such a measure reects the overall eective
tax burden on consumption and should therefore be preferred over studies based on nom-
inal sales tax rates only. Studies on commodity tax competition use either statutory sales
tax rates (e.g., Rork, 2003; and Luna, 2004) or statutory (specic) excise tax rates (e.g.,
Nelson, 2002; Egger et al., 2005a; and Devereux et al., 2007).6 The study by Egger et al.
(2005b), using data for OECD countries, is a notable exception because they are the only
ones analyzing AETRs. In the context of the United States, studies have not employed
AETRs yet, reecting the absence of ocial statistics on consumption at the state level.
In this paper, we approximate state consumption on goods and services by non-durable
retail sales by state|taken from the Survey of Buying Power|and an estimate for durable
consumption.
A second contribution is that we explore the eect of a state's spatial characteristics|
that is, its size, geographic position, and border length|on tax setting. Spatial eects are
taken into account in the regression equation in two ways. We employ four dierent weight-
5See Mendoza et al. (1994) for a further exposition on the concept of AETRs.
6Devereux et al. (2007) correct the statutory (nominal) tax rates for ination to arrive at a real tax
rate. Note that the denition of an AETR implies that we do not have to worry about ination correction.
2ing schemes in characterizing the weighted average of AETRs of competing jurisdictions.
We expect our estimate of the tax reaction coecient (i.e., the slope of the tax reaction
function) to be sensitive to the ex ante imposed spatial structure. In addition, we explicitly
model (as separate variables in the equation) both time-variant and time-invariant spatial
characteristics, which may aect the intercept of the tax reaction function.
Our third contribution is the explicit acknowledgement of the possibility of dynamics
in our empirical tax competition model. If states react to each others' tax setting, the
weighted average of competitors tax rates|which we use as an explanatory variable|is
endogenous. The literature addresses this by employing an instrumental variable (IV)
approach, typically also including state-specic xed eects and time-specic xed eects.
We show that results obtained in this framework suer from heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation in the disturbances. Heteroscedasticity can be addressed by employing White-
corrected standard errors, but the serial correlation poses a more serious challenge. It
cannot be dealt with by including an instrumented lagged dependent variable in the \levels"
specication (as proposed by Devereux et al., 2007) because of the correlation between the
error term and xed eects, on the one hand, and the lagged dependent variable on the
other hand. To address this problem, we apply the Arellano-Bond (1991) Dynamic Panel
Data (DPD) estimator to the tax reaction function written in \rst dierences."
The tax interaction coecient in the levels specication (which does not correct for au-
tocorrelation) is sensitive to the type of weighting scheme chosen. It yields a tax interaction
coecient in the range [0.57, 0.93], where the upper bound is obtained if competitors tax
rates are weighted by distance and the lower bound results if population density weights
are employed. By applying the DPD estimator, we nd a tax reaction coecient in the
range [0.39, 0.48], which is much lower than the one estimated in levels. In both static and
dynamic cases, strategic interaction seem to have lessened in the 1990s as compared to the
early 1980s.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical background to con-
sumption tax competition. Section 3 sets out the methodological framework and discusses
identication issues. Section 4 presents data on tax rate changes. Section 5 discusses the
empirical results and performs a simple sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Hypotheses
Our analysis builds on the theoretical tax competition literature, in which the strategic
interaction among governments in tax setting is analyzed. The classic reference in the
analysis of \origin-based" commodity tax competition is Kanbur and Keen (1993), who
employ a simple cross-border shopping model, featuring two jurisdictions of xed areal size.
Kanbur and Keen consider a uniformly distributed population, which diers in size across
jurisdictions. Households buy one unit of a commodity, which has a xed producer price
(assumed to be the same in both jurisdictions). A commodity's retail price in jurisdiction
i consists of the sum of a specic consumption tax, i, and the producer price. The
representative household faces xed transaction costs per unit of traveled distance if it
purchases goods across the border. No travel costs are incurred if the consumer purchases
goods locally. It follows that the consumer's decision to cross-border shop depends on a
comparison between the transactions costs incurred in purchasing the goods in the other
jurisdiction and the consumption taxes saved in doing so.
Both governments are assumed to set their consumption tax rates to maximize revenue,
while taking as given the tax rate set by the other jurisdiction. This yields a tax reaction
function of the general form: i = f(j;Vi), where Vi is a vector of characteristics of state
i (e.g., state size) and f is a linear function (with f0 > 0).7 The two tax reaction functions
can be solved to yield closed-form solutions for the optimal (Nash) tax rates. Equilibrium
7In fact, Kanbur and Keen (1993) show that the tax reaction functions are piecewise linear.
4tax rates are shown to be below the social optimum, reecting the eect of tax competition,
and to be asymmetric (see below).
Ohsawa (1999) extends Kanbur and Keen's model to a multi-jurisdictional setting in
which countries dier in areal size and consumers are uniformly distributed across markets.8
He veries the robustness of Kanbur and Keen's results to a larger number of jurisdictions.
In turn, Ohsawa and Koshizuka (2003) investigate commodity tax competition between
two jurisdictions in a two-dimensional setting, that is, including jurisdictional size and
jurisdictional shape (e.g., border curvature and border length). In addition to showing
that spatial characteristics matter, Ohsawa and Koshizuka (2003) demonstrate that the
results obtained by Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Ohsawa (1999) are still valid. The above
mentioned papers lead to the following three hypotheses, which we will employ in our
empirical analysis.9
Strategic interaction in tax rate setting results in upward-sloping tax reaction functions
(Hypothesis 1). The slope of the reaction function should be smaller than one to ensure
the existence of a Nash equilibrium in tax rates. Obviously, the \knife-edge" case of a
zero slope is of little practical interest because it implies that interaction between (local)
governments is absent.
Hypothesis 1 (Kanbur and Keen, 1993) A state's consumption tax rate is positively
related to that of its neighbors.
State (or jurisdictional) size plays a key role in consumption tax rate setting. Small
jurisdictions have a smaller intercept of the tax reaction function than larger jurisdictions
[Hypothesis 2(a)]. By undercutting, a small jurisdiction attracts cross-border shoppers
(and thus generates extra revenue at a given tax rate), which exceeds the revenue loss
8In Ohsawa's model population density is constant across countries, whereas in Kanbur and Keen's
world countries dier in population density.
9In view of the well developed existing theoretical frameworks, we have chosen not to develop our own
analytical model.
5from a lower tax rate applied to resident consumers. For a large jurisdiction, however, the
revenue loss on the domestic base exceeds the revenue gain from cross-border shoppers.
Ohsawa (1999) hypothesizes that the intercept of the tax reaction function of the home
state rises with the size of the neighboring jurisdictions [Hypothesis 2(b)]. Kanbur and
Keen (1993) and Nielsen (2001) show that this relationship is not clear-cut; undercutting
the tax rate of the neighboring jurisdiction may be an attractive strategy for a small
jurisdiction.
Hypothesis 2 (Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Ohsawa, 1999) (a) Small jurisdictions tend
to set lower equilibrium consumption tax rates than large jurisdictions [Kanbur and Keen,
1993]; and (b) The consumption tax rate of the home jurisdiction is strictly increasing in
the jurisdictional size of its competitors [Ohsawa, 1999].
Spatial characteristics of jurisdictions aect tax setting as is demonstrated by Ohsawa
and Koshizuka (2003). Peripheral jurisdictions|of which (part of) their border is not
exposed to competitive pressure from other states|set higher tax rates [Hypothesis 3(a)].
For example, Florida features a large unexposed border on the Atlantic Ocean and the
Mexican gulf. For a given jurisdiction size, a more curved border or an increase in border
length means a larger area exposed to cross-border shopping and the resulting competitive
pressure. Consequently, exposed jurisdictions set lower tax rates [Hypothesis 3(b-c)].
Hypothesis 3 (Ohsawa and Koshizuka, 2003) (a) For equally sized jurisdictions, con-
sumption tax rates in peripheral jurisdictions are signicantly higher than those in juris-
dictions situated in the center of a federal country; (b) The consumption tax rate of a
jurisdiction decreases if its border becomes more curved; and (c) The consumption tax rate
of a jurisdiction decreases if its border length increases.
63 Methodology
This section estimates tax reaction functions, which are specied in reduced form. To
measure empirically strategic interaction among local governments, we need to address
the issue of identication. In other words, do our results point to strategic interaction
or is there some other cause (e.g., common shocks to a state's tax policy)? After a brief
discussion of identication, this section describes the econometric specication of the tax
reaction function, presents various weighting matrices, and discusses some econometric
issues.
3.1 Identication in the Endogenous Interactions Model
Manski (1993) shows that the parameters in models of social/spatial interaction, the class
to which tax competition belongs, are only identied under some strict assumptions. He
denes three types of interaction: (i) contextual eects (related to exogenous characteristics
of the group); (ii) endogenous eects (interaction between the units in the group); and (iii)
correlated eects (characteristics that the units have in common, making them behave
similarly). The challenge is to disentangle these three eects econometrically in a single
equation.
To formally illustrate this, consider the following general cross-sectional model for a
given time period:
Yi =  + E(YijZi) + X
0
i + E(XijZi)
0 + ui; i = 1;:::;N; (1)
where Yi is the dependent variable (in our case the tax rate), Zi is a vector of exogenous
characteristics of the group (where boldface characters denote vectors), Xi are the observed
characteristics of the units, E is the expectations operator, and N denotes the number of
cross-sectional units. The parameters to be estimated are , , , and . The unobserved
characteristics of individuals are included in ui and are assumed to be correlated across
7the individuals in the group, that is, E(ujXi;Zi) = Z
0
i. This implies that the expected
value of Yi given the observed variables Xi and Zi is given by:






In this equation, the endogenous eect is measured by the parameter , the contextual
eect by , and the correlated eect by . The reduced form of this model:
E(YijXi;Zi) = =(1   ) + E(XijZi)
0( + )=(1   ) + Z
0
i=(1   );  6= 1; (3)
shows that the dierent social eects cannot be identied separately without imposing
further restrictions.
As a rst step in solving the specied identication problem, we can consider some
of the practical restrictions imposed by the tax competition literature.10 In general, the
literature ignores the interaction eect between the observed group characteristics and
the observed individual characteristics and thus assumes implicitly that  = 0. This
leaves use with the identication of the endogenous eect () and the correlated eect (),
which is infeasible because both the conditional mean, E(YijXi), and the exogenous group
characteristics, Z
0
i are constant over the cross-sectional units. The spatial econometrics
literature address this issue by replacing E(YijXi) with WYi, where W is a N N matrix
of exogenously given spatial weights; WYi is thus a weighted average of the dependent
variable in other (neighboring) jurisdictions. The identication problem is solved because
the weighted average of neighbors introduces some cross-sectional variation in WYi, as not
all jurisdictions in the sample are treated identically, while Zi remains constant.
10As Revelli (2005) points out there is also a second identication issue that plagues the empirical tax
competition literature more generally. Based on a reduced-form equation such as (3), we are not able to
discriminate between alternative theories of local government interaction (e.g., tax competition, yardstick
competition, and spillovers of expenditures). We will not address this in the paper because this requires
estimating a structural model.
83.2 Econometric Specication
The econometric specication of the theoretical tax reaction function explicitly takes into
account the spatial pattern of tax competition. We employ a panel data set so that we can
control for unobserved heterogeneity and study the dynamics of tax competition.
Tax Reaction Function
The AETR of state i = 1;:::;N at time t = 1;:::;T is denoted by  it, where N denotes
the number of states and T represents the number of time periods. Now using the two
assumptions introduced in the previous subsection, that is, assuming  = 0 and replac-
ing the conditional mean with the weighted average of the dependent variable in other
(neighboring) jurisdictions, the tax reaction function of state i can be written as:




it + "it; (4)





it denote vectors of variables representing spatial and demographic
characteristics of states and various control variables, respectively, with 0s and 0s as
parameters.11 An error term, "it, completes the function. The tax rate of state i is a
function of tax setting by its competitors, represented by the spatial lag term, Wk it, where
Wk is a N  N matrix of spatial weights (see below). Because the AETR is by denition
in the range [0;1], and thus a bounded outcome score, we take a logistic transformation
 it  ln(it=(1   it)), where it is the AETR.12 The logistic transformation is applied to
the AETR variable on both sides of equation (4).
Based on Hypothesis 1, we expect positively sloped reaction functions, that is, 0 <
 < 1. To test Hypothesis 2(a) we include the population size of state i and expect
11Notice that the correlated eect from the social interactions model discussed in the previous section
implies a xed time eect in a panel data model, which is measured by .
12The logistic transformation was originally suggested by Johnson (1949) to analyze bounded outcomes
(e.g., [0,1] scores).
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1 > 0. Given Hypothesis 2(b), we expect the weighted population size of neighboring
states to yield 2 > 0. Sea-bordered states|for which the dummy variable takes on the
value one|are expected to set higher tax rates, that is, 3 < 0 [Hypothesis 3(a)]. Border
curvature|dened as the ratio of border length and state size|depresses tax rates and
thus 4 < 0 [Hypothesis 3(b)]. Border exposure, which is measured by the population
density along the border region of both states i and j, has a depressing eect on tax rates
(i.e., 5 < 0).
Our specication includes year-specic xed eects and state-specic xed eects. We
include time eects to capture shocks that aect all states simultaneously, for example,
a rise in the world oil price. The time eect also picks up changes in federal excise
taxes, which we have not explicitly modeled.13 State-specic xed eects|which are time
invariant|are incorporated to control for unobserved heterogeneity across states as well as
historical dierences. Intuitively, some states (e.g., Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire,
and Oregon) oppose any sales taxation.
Weight Matrices
The weighting matrix reects the importance of other states in inuencing tax setting
behavior of a particular state. The literature does not give much formal guidance on the
choice of appropriate weight matrix.14 Most often (xed) geographic criteria are used,
which yield purely exogenous weights. We apply four dierent specications of weight
matrices. The rst matrix is constructed using the contiguity of states, that is, whether
13See Besley and Rosen (1998) and Devereux et al. (2007) for a empirical model incorporating both
horizontal competition (i.e., between states) and vertical competition (i.e., between states and the federal
level).
14Dening a weighting matrix is a standard practice in the literature not only for identication purposes
(see Section 3.1) but also to reduce the large number of parameters that otherwise need to be estimated.
The trivial weighting scheme of giving each state a uniform weight is not considered because it does
capture any state characteristics. Moreover, we will not be able to incorporate time xed eects while
using a weighted average of all other states' tax rates.







j=1 bij > 0 for i 6= j
0 for i = j;
(5)
where bij is a border dummy which equals one when states i and j = 1;:::;N share a
common border and zero otherwise. Diagonal elements are by denition zero. Because
rows are standardized (i.e., they add up to unity), the spatial lag represents a weighted
average of tax rates. The second matrix is constructed using the inverse of the squared
distance between two states to reect a gravity type of approach. In contrast to the
previous measure, the distance scheme captures tax competition among all states. The












ij > 0 for i 6= j
0 for i = j;
(6)
where dij reects the geographical distance between the largest cities of states i and j,
which is computed as the great circle distance given latitude and longitude.15 States
located far away from state i have a smaller impact upon its tax setting. Squaring the
distance introduces a non-linearity; it increases the weight assigned to states located close
to state i more than proportionally.
Both weighting matrices treat neighboring states with long borders|and thus more
opportunities for cross-border shopping|in the same manner as states with short borders.
Therefore, we also experiment with a third weighting scheme, which takes into account








j=1 lij > 0 for i 6= j
0 for i = j;
(7)
15Note that the largest city is not always situated in the center of the state. All possible alternative
reference points, however, are equally disputable.
11where l is the length (in miles) of the common border between states i and j. States
with long borders, however, are not necessarily those featuring the largest number of cross-
border shoppers. The incidence of cross-border shopping also depends on the population
density along the border, which the nal weighting scheme intends to capture. We calculate
population density along the border as sij  Pij + Pji, where Pij is the population in all
counties in state i adjacent to the common border of states i and j and Pji denotes the
population in all counties in state j adjacent to the common border of states i and j. The







j=1 sij > 0 for i 6= j
0 for i = j:
(8)
We take population data at the country level for the year 2000 and assume that the weights
remain constant over time.
Control Variables
The control variables can be classied into three broad categories: scal, political, and
business cycle variables. The rst category measures the eect of dierences in scal
policies across states. Two measures are used. The rst is per capita public expenditure.
Intuitively, as public expenditure rises, the state needs more revenue to balance its budget,
providing an incentive to raise consumption tax rates.16 Second, we use the lagged tax
structure, which is dened as the ratio of direct tax revenue to indirect tax revenue. States
with a higher ratio are expected to levy lower consumption taxes.
In keeping with Egger et al. (2005b) and Devereux et al. (2007), we include a variable
representing a state's political orientation, which gets the value one in a year the governor
16The majority of states are required to balance their budget at the end of the scal year (28 in our
sample) and some (seven in our sample) require a balanced budget over a two-year cycle. In addition, 36
states have debt restrictions of which 14 require a popular vote to issue any debt. See Table 3 of Poterba
and Rueben (2001).
12of a state is a Democrat and a zero otherwise. We hypothesize that Republican states
prefer a smaller size of the public sector|and therefore are less likely to set high tax
rates|than Democratic states (Reed, 2006). The unemployment rate is used to measure
the impact of the business cycle on tax setting behavior of governments. It picks up two
opposing eects. On the one hand, in an economic downturn state governments are less
inclined to raise tax rates. On the other hand, the unemployment rate captures the eect
of automatic stabilizers. A higher unemployment rate leads to more social security outlays
and therefore yields an upward pressure on the tax rate. It is not a priori clear which force
dominates.
Econometric Issues
Equation (4) shows that the consumption tax rates of competitors enter contemporane-
ously (i.e.,  i depends on  j in the same time period), implying that we have to control for
endogeneity. In that case, ordinary least squares estimation will be inconsistent, reect-
ing correlation between  it and "it. We therefore resort to the IV approach, which yields
consistent estimates even in the case of spatial error dependence. Following Kelejian and
Prucha (1998), a mix of explanatory variables and weighted explanatory variables is used
as instruments. More specically, the weighted AETR is instrumented with the weighted
unemployment rate and the weighted per capita public expenditure. The remaining vari-
ables are predetermined, lagged one period, and therefore also included in the instrument
matrix.
3.3 Dynamics
Typically, dynamics are neglected in the estimation of tax reaction functions. A notable
exception is Devereux et al. (2007), who deal with serial correlation by including a lagged
dependent variable in their model. Because the lagged dependent variable correlates with
13the state xed eect, they instrument it by including the second lag of the dependent
variable. This instrument, however, still correlates with the error term (including the xed
eects) and thus invalidates the results. An ideal instrument would have been the state
decit-to-GDP ratio if it were not subject to legal and political restrictions (see footnote
16). We cannot think of any other candidate instruments and therefore adopt an alternative
approach.
We include a lagged endogenous variable in the tax reaction function of equation (4):
 it = i +  i;t 1 + Wk it + 
0Qit + 
0Xit + "it; (9)
where  is the coecient of the lagged dependent variable, which capture dynamics. Sub-
sequently, we use the Arellano-Bond (1991) DPD estimator, which is a General Method of
Moments (GMM) estimator correcting for endogeneity by including lags of the dependent
and explanatory variables.17 The model is rst dierenced, implying that any (unobserved)
state xed eects as well as (observed) time-invariant variables are excluded. By applying
the rst dierencing operation, we obtain:
~  it = ~  i;t 1 + Wk~  it + ~ Q
0
it + ~ X
0
it + ~ "it; (10)
where ~ rit  rit   ri;t 1 for r 2 f ;Q;X;"g. It is important to recognize that the coef-
cients ;;, and  are still identied in the rst dierenced model and have the same
interpretation as in the levels model. When estimating this model, the use of the DPD
solves the endogeneity problem by instrumenting both the time-lag of the dependent vari-
able and the weighted (neighboring) states tax rates. For instrumenting the time-lag of
the dependent variable, we use the dynamic instruments suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991). As instruments for the weighted neighboring states tax rates, we choose per capita
public expenditure and the unemployment rate (appropriately weighted by the respective
17See Baltagi (2005, Section 8.2) for details.
14Wk matrix). It is important to recognize that the GMM method is robust against the
distribution of the dependent variable.
Finally, the proposed instruments used in the GMM estimator must be valid, meaning
that they are independent of unobserved heterogeneity and the error term. When the
number of instruments is greater than the number of included endogenous variables, the
validity of the selected instruments can be tested via an overidentifying restrictions test.
We employ a Sargan test.18 Unless reported otherwise, the Sargan overidentication test
outcomes indicate that our instruments are valid (see Tables 3{5 below).
4 Data
Our data set covers 48 states over the period 1977{2002. Table A.1 in Appendix A presents
the data denitions and sources. We do not include Alaska and Hawaii in our panel because
these two states do not share borders with any other states in the United States. In
addition, the District of Columbia (DC) is excluded, because of its special characteristics.
DC is extremely small in size (68.3 square miles) and is mainly a working district.19
4.1 Estimating Average Eective Tax Rates
AETRs are dened as the ratio of consumption tax revenue to (before-tax) consumption
expenditures. Statistics on consumption expenditures by state are not available. Following
Ostergaard et al. (2002), we approximate private nondurable consumption expenditures at
the state level by state-level data on retail sales of nondurable goods, which are reported in
the Survey of Buying Power (published in Sales and Marketing Management). We estimate
18The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The Sargan
statistic is 2
(n k) distributed, where n denotes the rank of the instrument matrix and k is the number of
estimated coecients.
19People living in DC spend their money in the surrounding states (i.e., Maryland and Virginia), where
the majority of shopping malls are located.
15state-level private spending on durable consumption goods.20 We prefer using AETRs
instead of statutory sales tax rates as indicator of the tax burden for three compelling
reasons. First and foremost, consumers base their consumption decision upon the total
consumption tax burden on goods. More specically, the consumer compares the dierence
in tax burdens between the respective neighboring states and that of the own state with the
transaction costs of purchasing in another state.21 Suppose a consumer purchases one unit
of a consumption good subject to both an ad valorem sales tax, s (measured in percent
of value), and a specic excise tax, e (measured in US dollars per unit). Given that the
sales tax on goods and services is paid on an excise-tax inclusive base, we get tax payments
(excluding any federal excises) of:
T  (p + e)(1 + s)   p = e + ps + es; (11)
where p denotes the sales price exclusive of tax. On key commodities|that is, beer,
cigarettes, distilled spirits, gasoline, and wine|the consumer pays both excises (the rst
term on the right-hand side of (11)) and sales tax (the second term), which none of the
previous studies takes into account. Note that the commodities which are most likely to be
featuring in cross-borders purchases are typically subject to excises. The share of excises
in total consumption tax revenue in the year 2002 amounts on the order of 40 percent.
To study tax competition, one can thus not solely focus on one tax category. Notice that
equation (11) also shows that the consumer pays \tax-on-tax" (the last term), which is not
picked up by measures based on the sum of statutory tax rates. Although small in many
cases, the tax interaction eect makes a dierence for items such as distilled spirits. For
20We assume a xed share of durable private consumption goods. Aggregate US durable private con-
sumption is approximated by the dierence between aggregate US private consumption expenditures and
aggregate US retail sales (both measured at market prices). Note that this also includes nondurable pri-
vate consumption expenditures that are not included in retail sales (e.g., travel expenditures). We focus
on private consumption only because we do not have state-level data on goods and services purchased by
the government. The latter amounts to roughly 5 percent of total goods and services consumption across
states.
21Federal excises do not play a role in this comparison, but county level sales taxes on goods and services
could be important. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the latter.
16example, in the state New Mexico the sales tax rate amounts to 5 percent and the excise
on distilled spirits is US$ 6.06 per gallon, yielding a tax-interaction eect of US$ 0.30 per
gallon. Second, AETRs include all relevant components of a tax law (such as exemptions)
and take into account the degree of tax enforcement, allowing us to compare states with
very distinct tax structures and tax enforcement cultures. For example, Montana does
not have a sales tax but generates a signicant amount of consumption tax revenue (23.6
percent of total revenue in 2001), reecting excise tax revenue. Third, AETRs change
annually, whereas statutory tax rates change less frequently.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics on Tax Rate Setting
The top panel of Table 1 presents statistics describing the number of rate changes across
states and over time. Not surprisingly, state governments tinker the most with gasoline
excises. Excises on cigarettes feature the second highest mean number of changes. The
normalized standard deviation22 of rate changes for these two products are the smallest,
suggesting that the majority of states cluster around the mean and thus compete heavily.
Nebraska adjusts its gasoline excises a record number of times. New York is the leader in
changing its beer, wine, and distilled spirits excises. States change their statutory sales tax
rates on average two times during a time span of 26 years, which is smaller than the average
for excises (three changes). Some states (e.g., Maryland) do not adjust their sales tax rates
at all, whereas New Mexico changes its sales tax rate about six times. Not surprisingly,
tax rate increases are much more common than tax rate reductions. More specically, our
data set reveals that only 17 of 96 (18 percent) changes in sales taxes pertain to tax rate
reductions. We nd roughly similar evidence for gasoline excises, for which we observe tax
rate reductions in 16 percent of the cases.
22The standard deviation of the tax rate of a particular state is divided by the mean of the tax rate of
that state (known as the coecient of variation) to facilitate a unit free statistic that can be compared
across states and tax categories.
17The center panel of Table 1 shows the mean size of tax changes (in absolute terms). The
overall average change in the sales tax rate is very small (on the order of 0.07 percentage
points). Once we exclude all observations where tax rates do not change, the average
sales tax change is much higher; it amounts to 0.88 percentage points, which is roughly 20
percent of the overall average sales tax rate. Gasoline excises change more frequently and
are of smaller size (15 percent of the average rate). The absolute change in the AETR is
much larger than that of the sales tax, reecting the contribution of revenue from excises.
The bottom panel shows that the average statutory sales tax rate amounts to 5.2 percent
in 2002. It thereby exceeds the AETR (4.1 percent), owing to collection losses on sales
taxes (reecting tax evasion, exemptions and the like) exceeding the additional revenue
generated by excises. Average excise tax rates per gallon vary between US$ 0.19 (gasoline)
and US$ 3.55 (distilled spirits). Florida sets the highest excises on distilled spirits and
wine (US$ 2.25).
Table 2 shows that the average statutory sales tax across state groupings varies be-
tween 3.5 percent and 5.3 percent. Middle Atlantic States (New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania) have the highest statutory sales tax. The overall average statutory sales
tax rate is slightly higher than the AETR, which is not necessarily true for particular
state groups. For example, the Pacic Coast States (California, Oregon, and Washington)
appear to have a higher AETR, possibly reecting substantial excise revenue collections.
In addition, AETRs are not necessarily more variable than statutory tax rates. In the
aggregate, the variability of AETRs is similar to that of statutory sales tax rates. By state
grouping the two measures dier, but there is no systematic pattern.
185 Empirical Results
Table 3 shows estimation outcomes of the static tax reaction function (see equation (4)),
using the four dierent weight matrices introduced above. The tax reaction coecient
can be interpreted as a `corrected tax elasticity,' reecting the logarithmic transformation






^ it = , where  it  ln(^ it) and ^ it 
it
1 it.23 For all four weighting matrices,
we nd a positive slope of the tax reaction function in line with Hypothesis 1. All slope
parameters are smaller than one, which ensures the existence of a Nash equilibrium in tax
rates. However, the size of the slope parameter varies with the weight matrix used. The
distance weight matrix, WD, produces the highest slope coecient (0.93), whereas the
population density weight matrix, WP, is lowest (0.57). In addition, state size enters the
model with a positive sign and the weighted size of neighboring states with a negative sign.24
The rst outcome is in accordance with Hypothesis 2(a), but the second outcome does not
corroborate Hypothesis 2(b), although this result is foreshadowed by Nielsen (2001). The
signicance of the tax structure and per capita public expenditure, both lagged one period,
complete the model. Both show the expected sign. Lagged unemployment and political
orientation did not prove to be signicant.
To investigate Hypothesis 3, we include several spatial characteristics in the tax reaction
function with the population density weight matrix.25 We drop state xed-eects from the
model to avoid multicollinearity between time-invariant spatial characteristics and xed
eects. Table 4 reports the outcomes. A direct consequence of replacing state xed eects
by spatial characteristics is a reduction in the adjusted R2. Apparently, state xed eects
23Note tat  = 1
^ it
@^ it
@Qi and  = 1
^ it
@^ it
@Zi are interpreted as semi-elasticities.
24We experimented with dierent measures of state size (i.e., surface area and labor force), which did
not inuence our conclusions.
25The population density weight matrix has the highest intuitive appeal. Experiments with the other
three weights, however, yield the same qualitative conclusions.
19explain a larger share of the variation than the respective spatial variable that is included.
Hypothesis 3 seems to hold. All spatial variables, which enter the tax reaction function
separately, have a signicant impact on the tax rate. However, border curvature does not
have the a priori expected negative sign. Border exposure, that is, the density of people
living in counties near the state border, has a direct negative impact on the tax rate.
The inclusion of spatial characteristics does not aect the slope of the tax reaction
function, which stays close to 0.5. However, the parameters of state size and weighted size
of neighboring states change sign, and the eect of lagged per capita public expenditure
becomes much larger. In contrast to the previous table, lagged unemployment and political
orientation play a role. These control variables do have the ex ante expected signs.
The static tax reaction function outcomes as presented in Tables 3 and 4 suer from
serial correlation, as can be seen from the Wooldridge (2002, pp. 282-83) serial correlation
test. Therefore, Table 5 presents estimates of the dynamic tax reaction function [equations
(9){(10]. Here, we report the usual standard deviations instead of White diagonal standard
deviations. The lagged endogenous variable is highly signicant for all specications of the
weight matrix, with parameter estimates just above 0.5. Do our hypotheses still hold for the
dynamic tax reaction function? The slopes of the tax reaction functions are signicantly
positive, but become less steep compared to the static model. Therefore, Hypothesis 1
still holds. The evidence for Hypothesis 2 is mixed. We do not nd a signicant eect of
state size on the tax rate [Hypothesis 2(a)]. We do nd, however, a signicantly negative
eect of the size of neighboring states [Hypothesis 2(b)]. Notice that, as mentioned before,
theoretically the interpretation of the coecients does not change after a rst dierencing
operation has been applied. A disadvantage of the Arellano-Bond DPD estimator is that
time-invariant variables cannot be included explicitly in the model. Therefore, we cannot
formally address Hypothesis 3 in this framework.
To investigate whether tax competition has changed over time, we split the sample into
20two subperiods: 1977{1990 and 1991{2003. For all weighting matrices, we nd that the
slope parameter is much larger in the rst subperiod as compared to the second subperiod.
This is true for both the xed eects and the dynamic model. To illustrate, we will focus
on the population density weight matrix.26 Turning to the xed eects model rst, we
nd that the slope parameter in the rst subperiod is signicant and exceeds unity (i.e.,
1:03); it is thus much larger than the coecient of 0:57 for the full sample. Furthermore,
the slope parameter in the second subperiod is insignicant, suggesting a higher degree of
strategic interaction between state governments in the rst period. For the dynamic model
during the rst period, we nd a signicant slope parameter of 0:72, which again exceeds
the (signicant) value of 0:39 based on the complete sample. In the second subperiod, we
nd a signicant slope parameter of 0:12, suggesting a larger degree of tax competition in
the 1980s.
6 Conclusions
This paper measured tax competition between US states, using a panel data set of state-
level consumption taxes (i.e., retail sales taxes on goods and services and excise taxes
collected by state governments) for the period 1977{2003 covering 48 states. We estimate
both static and dynamic tax reaction functions.
We found strong evidence for strategic interaction among US states, both in static
and dynamic tax reaction functions. We observed a larger degree of strategic interaction
during the 1980s than during the 1990s. In addition, spatial characteristics inuence both
the intercept and the slope of the tax reaction function. States near the oceans and Mexican
Gulf set higher tax rates than inland states. Finally, a higher population density along the
border region has a negative impact on consumption tax rates.
26The results for the other weighting matrices are available upon request from the authors.
21In future work, we intend to apply the analysis to a broad set of (more heterogeneous)
countries, including OECD and non-OECD countries. Further research should also address





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 2: Statutory and Average Eective Tax Rates by Region, 1977{
2002
Regiona Average statutory AETRb
sales tax rate
Average Variationc Average Variationc
Middle Atlantic States 5.28 0.031 4.09 0.084
Midwestern States 4.57 0.149 3.30 0.092
New England States 4.64 0.078 3.74 0.124
Pacic Coast States 3.79 0.082 4.13 0.098
Rocky Mountain States 3.52 0.114 3.77 0.141
Southern States 4.22 0.106 4.45 0.105
Southwestern States 4.53 0.190 4.46 0.119
Average 4.36 0.107 4.06 0.109
Sources: Oce of Tax Policy Research, World Tax Database; and authors' own cal-
culations.
a The grouping of states is as follows: Middle Atlantic States (New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania), Midwestern States (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wis-
consin), New England States (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island, and Vermont), Pacic Coast States (California, Oregon, and
Washington), Rocky Mountain States (Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah,
and Wyoming), Southern States (Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia), and Southwestern States (Arizona, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas). Alaska and Hawaii are excluded, yielding a total
of 48 states.
b The AETR denotes the average eective consumption tax rate.
c The coecient of variation (dened as the mean divided by the standard deviation)
measures the average variation of the tax rate in the specic region.
24Table 3: Static Model With Both State and Time Fixed Eects
Weighting matrix Contiguity Distance Border length Population
Weighted AETR 0.689*** 0.927*** 0.703*** 0.572***
(0.167) (0.208) (0.181) (0.156)
State size 0.018*** 0.011** 0.015*** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Weighted state size of neighbors -0.041*** -0.021 -0.023** -0.018*
(0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009)
Tax structure at t   1 -0.213*** -0.208*** -0.200*** -0.209***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Per capita public expenditure at t   1 0.039*** 0.036** 0.042** 0.041**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Unemployment rate at t   1 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Political orientation -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Adj. R2 0.941 0.942 0.939 0.942
Observations 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248
Sargan test 0.006 0.429 0.000 0.985
p-value 0.940 0.510 0.980 0.320
Wooldridge test 16.651 18.759 15.047 17.302
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Instrument rank 81 81 81 81
Notes: ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. White diagonal standard
deviations are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates. Period and cross-section xed
eects are included. The weighted AETR is instrumented with the weighted unemployment rate and
the weighted per capita public expenditure. The remaining variables are assumed to be exogenous and
therefore also included in the instrument matrix. Reported value for the Wooldridge test is the t-statistic.
25Table 4: Static Model with Time Fixed Eects and Various Spatial Characteristics
Spatial characteristics Sea bordered Border curvature Border length
Population weighted AETR 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.523***
(0.108) (0.107) (0.127)
State size -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Weighted state size of neighbors 0.007** 0.005** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tax structure t   1 -0.346*** -0.340*** -0.343***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Per capita public expenditure t   1 0.304*** 0.339*** 0.321***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Unemployment rate t   1 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Political orientation 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.05***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Dummy sea bordered 0.078*** { {
(0.016)
Border curvature { 1.717*** {
(0.420)
Border length { { -0.099***
(0.028)
Exposure -0.033** -0.063*** -0.045***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
Adj. R2 0.681 0.678 0.657
Observations 1,248 1,248 1,248
Sargan test 0.124 0.013 0.078
p-value 0.720 0.908 0.779
Wooldridge test 24.809 25.230 23.015
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Instrument rank 36 36 36
Notes: ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. White diagonal standard
errors are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates. Only year xed eects are included.
The weighted AETR is instrumented by the unemployment rate and per capita public expenditure
(both weighted twice). The remaining variables are considered to be exogenous. Reported value for the
Wooldridge test is the t-statistic.
26Table 5: Dynamic Model Estimated Using Arellano-Bond
Weighting matrix Contiguity Distance Border length Population
Lagged AETR 0.554*** 0.524*** 0.515*** 0.541***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.032) (0.029)
Weighted AETR 0.409*** 0.483*** 0.406*** 0.394***
(0.029) (0.043) (0.037) (0.041)
State size 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Weighted state size of neighbors -0.015* -0.008 -0.015** -0.011*
(0.008) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006)
Tax structure t   1 -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.058*** -0.062***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Per capita public expenditure t   1 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Unemployment rate t   1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Political orientation 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Adj. R2 0.547 0.555 0.537 0.538
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
Sargan test 41.479 41.131 39.225 39.899
p-value 0.406 0.465 0.505 0.475
Instrument rank 48 49 48 48
Notes: ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses below the parameter estimates. State xed eects are included. The weighted
AETR is instrumented by the unemployment rate and the per capita public expenditure weighted by the
population density.
27Appendix
Table A.1 sets out the variable denitions and data sources.
Total retail sales reects net sales (gross sales minus refunds and allowances for re-
turns) for all establishments primarily engaged in retail trade, plus eating and drinking
establishments. Receipts from repairs and other services (by retailers) are also included,
but retail sales by wholesalers and service establishments are not. Note that sales for some
establishments (e.g., lumber yards, paint, glass, and wall-paper stores, and oce supply
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